Lead image by Jannik / Unsplash
By Stephen Saideman
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. All photos provided by The Conversation from various sources.
Stephen Saideman is the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University.
I just returned from the NATO summit in Washington, D.C., where there was much talk about the future of the alliance over the next 75 years.
As an international affairs expert, I am on the record as being profoundly skeptical that NATO will even survive another four years if Donald Trump becomes president for a second time.
Why? Mostly, because I take everything Trump has said about the alliance seriously and literally, and also because NATO relies so much on the American pledge to follow through on “an attack upon one equals an attack upon all,” the heart and key tenet of the alliance.
So, there are two steps here: Trump would undermine NATO, and the alliance would not survive it.
Trump’s anti-NATO consistency
Even before he even became president in 2016, Trump blasted the alliance as part of his election campaign, playing to isolationists and far-right voters.
Despite making claims that were simply wrong — for example, countries do not owe NATO money; the discussion of shortfalls refers to countries not spending enough on their own armed forces — his anti-NATO stance remained among the most consistent positions Trump took during and after his term.
He went so far as to say that under his presidency, he might not send American forces to defend any countries that fall short of the pledge to spend the equivalent of two per cent of their gross domestic product on defence.
Throughout his administration, Trump repeatedly raised the possibility of pulling out of NATO. United States Congress grew so concerned that it passed legislation making it impossible for presidents to pull out of the alliance themselves. But that hardly allays concerns, because the question is not just whether Trump would try to have the U.S. leave the alliance, but whether the Americans would act alongside their NATO partners if an ally were attacked.
There is no power anywhere in the U.S. constitution or anywhere else that can compel an American president to deploy forces. The War Powers Act only serves as a restraint — Congress could theoretically force the president to bring home troops that were sent off to fight an unpopular war. As commander-in-chief, it’s solely up to the president to decide to send troops into combat.
How Trump could defy NATO
NATO’s famous Article V, which is the assurance that an attack upon one will be treated as an attack on all, is not automatic in two important ways.
First, it requires the entire alliance to agree. NATO operates by consensus, so that if an ally is attacked, it only counts if the members, especially the most powerful ones, agree that an attack has occurred and then decide on a course of action. Trump could block efforts to get consensus by simply disagreeing.
Second, any country can opt out of a NATO mission even if Article V is invoked since the text says that each country will respond as “it deems necessary.”
In past missions, including the one time Article V was invoked in the aftermath of 9/11, some countries refrained from joining the collective effort. So, if, for example, Russia attacked NATO member Latvia — and somehow NATO gained consensus — Trump could not only refuse to send more troops, he could order those soldiers, sailors, aviators and Marines in the region to stand down.
This is extremely important because American forces are the nerves and circulatory system of NATO. Not only does the U.S. provide more troops than most, it also provides many crucial capabilities that are both necessary for an advanced military to operate effectively and rare — command and control systems that rely on encryption and satellites, the most advanced precision munitions, and more.
While the rest of NATO could eventually provide such resources, if Trump were to impose restraints in a crisis, the alliance would be critically handcuffed.
Deterring war
Finally, the primary mission of NATO is not to fight but to deter a war. The alliance, under American leadership, made tremendous efforts during the Cold War to deter an attack by the Soviet Union.
This deterrence remains important and seems to be working given Russia has yet to engage in any conventional assaults on NATO members (sabotage, assassination, election interference, disinformation and the like are something else), even as they send military equipment and other necessary resources to Ukraine.
Attacking Ukraine — not yet a member of NATO — is entirely different than attacking Latvia or some other member of the alliance. That deterrence is tied to the American nuclear umbrella — an attack upon one ally may lead to a process of escalation and counter-escalation that could ultimately lead to nuclear war. That threat deters Russia.
But if Trump tells Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russians that they can attack a NATO ally — or “to do whatever they hell they want,” as he said earlier this year — that deterrence is no longer in play.
While there are two other nuclear powers in NATO, they cannot provide the same deterrence threats as the United States. France, for example, largely refuses to do so (although President Emmanuel Macron was thinking of changing that before the recent elections), while the British relationship with Europe has been fraught in the aftermath of Brexit.
Simply put, the alliance relies on the credibility, and the assurances, that the United States would respond to an attack on any member. If an attack were to happen and NATO failed to respond, the alliance would likely fall apart. NATO really has one job, and if it fails at that, it will not last long.
Friday, July 12, 2024 in The Conversation
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